GM mosquitoes: hatch and release
HATCH AND RELEASE
By Camilo Rodríguez-Beltrán
In 2010 I read for the first time about the initial field experiments of genetically engineered mosquitoes that had taken place a year earlier in the Cayman Islands. This news came as a surprise to me, as I considered myself part of the independent scientific community continuously monitoring modern biotechnology advances and applications. Although British biotech company Oxitec's venture in developing GE mosquitoes was known, the astonishment came from the sudden jump to field release. I soon realized that I was not the only one missing a year of surveillance on this exercise: the release remained a de facto confidential test for a year.
In 2010 I read for the first time about the initial field experiments of genetically engineered mosquitoes that had taken place a year earlier in the Cayman Islands. This news came as a surprise to me, as I considered myself part of the independent scientific community continuously monitoring modern biotechnology advances and applications. Although British biotech company Oxitec's venture in developing GE mosquitoes was known, the astonishment came from the sudden jump to field release. I soon realized that I was not the only one missing a year of surveillance on this exercise: the release remained a de facto confidential test for a year.
It was difficult to understand the silence, intentional or not, on
the experimental release of these mosquitoes, in particular because
there were not hidden military or obscure purposes underlying the
technology. In fact, the intended use was described as a tool to tackle
dengue fever, one of the major public health issues in many developing
countries. With over 50 million infections every year, the fight against
this disease is one of the most important priorities for societies not
only in the developing world but also in some regions of the developed
world. Strategies range from vector management to early and accurate
diagnosis, and while the research on vaccines and viral drugs is under
development, no commercial vaccine is available for the moment.
Aedes aegypti is the principal, but not only, species of mosquito
capable of transmitting the virus through bites from the female to
humans. For this specific case, the technological strategy revolves
around the release of mainly male engineered A. aegypti mosquitoes. This
technology is called RIDL—Release with a Dominant Lethal—where the
insects carry a specific genetic switch that under certain conditions
causes death at the larval stage of their offspring. This application
aims to reduce the incidence of dengue fever by suppressing the mosquito
population.
At the molecular level, these GE mosquitoes have been designed with
two transgenes. The first one (DsRed2) produces a red fluorescency in
the organism under white light. This is a useful marker for selection
and also for monitoring. But the most interesting, and also complex,
piece of the system comes from the second transgene, the RIDL regulation
system.
Imagine your office door slightly open on a windy day: little by
little the door opens more and more as the wind pushes through. You can
stand up to try to close it but the wind is so strong that it will
reopen it again, and at one stage the door will be so wide open that the
wind will be strong enough to create a chaos (flying pages, knocking
over the coffee cup etc.). But suddenly you find the key to that door,
and by closing the door you have reduced the flow necessary to create
the chaos. Well, that is the RIDL system, a positive genetic feedback
loop that produces a protein (tTAV) that is able to guide more
production of itself (by acting positively on its own genetic promoter).
This results in an over expression of tTAV, at a concentration that
becomes lethal to mosquitoes' larvae. However there is one antidote, a
chemical called tetracycline, which if present will bind the tTAV
protein, reducing its presence in a free form to activate its promoter.
tTAV will still be produced, but at a lower concentration with no toxic
effect for the larvae. Just like the absence of a key allowed wind to
knock over the coffee cup inside the office, absence of tetracycline
will produce a lethal effect at the larval stage of the mosquitoes.
From a biosafety standpoint, risks related to these organisms follow some general issues:
(1) On modified mosquitoes: What will be the consequences in the ecological network of mosquitoes? What will be the effect on preys and predators? What will be the influence in other species of disease carrying mosquitoes? Could they benefit from a reduction in competition? Can the virus adapt better to other vectors because of this selection pressure?
(1) On modified mosquitoes: What will be the consequences in the ecological network of mosquitoes? What will be the effect on preys and predators? What will be the influence in other species of disease carrying mosquitoes? Could they benefit from a reduction in competition? Can the virus adapt better to other vectors because of this selection pressure?
(2) On GE organisms: What is the effect of the exposure to the DSRed2
and the tTAV proteins? What is the likelihood of instability of the
genetically added trait? Could it evolve resistance to the lethal
mechanism?
There are other specific issues related to the ability of flying and the difficulty of monitoring the distribution of the mosquitoes (in particular during transboundary movements), as well as issues related to the associated technology (for example, the need to act under absence of tetracycline).
There are other specific issues related to the ability of flying and the difficulty of monitoring the distribution of the mosquitoes (in particular during transboundary movements), as well as issues related to the associated technology (for example, the need to act under absence of tetracycline).
Some of these uncertainties regarding the implications on ecosystems
and health have apparently been accepted by some risk assessors, who
have given approvals for the field release of the GM mosquitoes not only
in the Cayman Islands but also in Malaysia and Brazil, with further
approvals pending in the United States. Some have highly criticized the
scientific approach used on these regulatory processes, and another
article in this issue of GeneWatch addresses the regulatory gaps in
these experiences.
I believe that the issues related to the associated technology are of
particular interest. It has been acknowledged by Oxitec that in the
absence of tetracycline, the survival rate of the GM mosquito larvae is
about 3% under laboratory conditions (the specific reasons for this
percentage of survival are unknown). It is interesting that some of the
strongest discussions with the promoter of these technologies are about
the numbers of surviving mosquitoes: Does it matter? Is it significant?
Is it negligible? Debates are currently ongoing and will continue, but
the fact is that the potential of having survivors is a reality, and
some of these will be females—and female mosquitoes, genetically
engineered or not, bite humans.
Another interesting factor is that the survival rate of GE mosquitoes
can be underestimated in real conditions—not only because of the
possibility of building a genetic resistance, but in particular because
the antidote, tetracycline, is one of the major antibiotics used both
for human health and agricultural practices. The major concentration of
tetracycline in urban areas is likely to be in sewage systems, and
recent literature has shown that A. aegypti does breed in dirty water;
therefore the scenario of breeding and development in potentially
tetracycline-contaminated aquatic environments, with the risk of
suppressing the lethal system, should now be considered. One could argue
that the concentrations in these environments will not be enough to
trigger survival, but in order to know this a meticulous surveillance
system of tetracycline concentration over time will be needed in the
regions intended for release. For the moment I am not aware of any such
initiatives, and I believe these will be very expensive and hard to put
in place.
Aside from these questions, what has not been covered is a thorough
analysis of the appropriateness of this strategy. It seems that the
context is not ready for the technology. The RIDL system was not
developed to tackle dengue; before mosquitoes, the technology was
designed for cotton bollworms, and it seems that other agricultural
pests will be targeted in the future. In other words, rather than
developing a technology for the purpose of reducing the incidence of
dengue fever, Oxitec developed the technology first and then looked for
situations where it could be put into use. In this particular case, the
use of tetracycline as an antidote makes things out in the environment a
little bit more complicated. If the technological solution had started
from the real challenge or opportunity then it seems very unlikely that
it would rely on an antidote that is currently available exactly where
you don't want it: in the waters where mosquito larvae grow.
I advocate for challenging solutions that rely solely on technology
and forget to start from a context-centered approach. I put the weight
on the challenge not really to the private companies, but on the
governments and public research initiatives that should be deciding the
best for all. Before asking "Does it work?" we need to ask: "Is it
appropriate?"
Camilo Rodríguez-Beltrán, MSc, is co-founder of the Taleo Initiative and was awarded the TEDGlobal2010 Fellowship.
Camilo Rodríguez-Beltrán, MSc, is co-founder of the Taleo Initiative and was awarded the TEDGlobal2010 Fellowship.
Etiquetas: Camilo Rodriguez-Beltran, Mosquito
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